| Recurring |
unknown |
The articles do not provide any information about a software failure incident happening again at either one specific organization or multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The article mentions a software security system developed by Frazer-Nash Research that is designed to prevent cybercriminals from hacking into vehicles. The system relies on a series of firewalls and unique data keys that cannot be cloned to keep vehicles from being hacked [45024].
(b) The article discusses how security experts have warned about the potential for hacking connected systems in self-driving cars. For example, a security expert demonstrated how easy it is to fool the remote sensing technology on self-driving vehicles using basic equipment like a laser pointer [45024]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to the vulnerability of car systems to hacking attempts originating from within the system itself. The article discusses how cybercriminals have targeted cars with on-board computers controlling various functions like locking, safety systems, auto braking, and power steering. The article highlights the development of a 'hack-proof' security system by Frazer-Nash Research, which includes firewalls, unique data keys, and a triple-check system to prevent hackers from gaining access to the vehicle's computer systems [45024]. This failure is within the system as it involves vulnerabilities in the software and security measures implemented within the car's systems. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The articles discuss the potential for software failure incidents related to non-human actions, particularly cybercriminal activities targeting vehicles' on-board computers to control locking and safety systems [45024]. The development of a 'hack-proof' car system by Frazer-Nash Research aims to prevent such incidents by implementing firewalls, unique data keys, and a triple-check system similar to that used by banks to protect against cyber attacks [45024].
(b) The articles also mention software failure incidents that could occur due to human actions. For example, security experts were able to hack into a Jeep Cherokee's computer system via its Wi-Fi connection, demonstrating vulnerabilities in the vehicle's security [45024]. Additionally, a security expert revealed how self-driving vehicles' remote sensing technology could be fooled using basic equipment, highlighting potential security blunders that could result from human actions [45024]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The article discusses a software failure incident related to hardware vulnerabilities in vehicles. It mentions how security experts hacked into a Jeep Cherokee's computer via its Wi-Fi connection, gaining control over critical safety systems like brakes and steering [45024]. This incident highlights how hardware vulnerabilities can lead to software failure incidents in vehicles.
(b) The article also addresses software failure incidents related to software vulnerabilities in vehicles. It talks about the need for bolstering security in vehicles to make them impervious to cyber criminals as autonomous vehicles roll out. The new 'hack-proof' security system developed by Frazer-Nash Research relies on firewalls, unique data keys, and a triple-check system to prevent hackers from gaining access to the vehicle's software [45024]. This demonstrates how software vulnerabilities can lead to software failure incidents in vehicles. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The objective of the software failure incident was malicious, as the article discusses the increasing threat of cybercriminals targeting cars and the need for hack-proof security systems to protect vehicles from malicious hacking attempts. It mentions how security experts have demonstrated vulnerabilities in cars, such as hacking into a Jeep Cherokee's computer system to control critical safety functions like braking and steering [45024]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to poor_decisions or accidental_decisions. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The articles do not mention any software failure incident related to development incompetence.
(b) The articles discuss the potential for software failure incidents related to accidental factors, such as cybercriminals targeting cars and vulnerabilities in vehicle systems that could be exploited by hackers [45024]. |
| Duration |
unknown |
The articles do not provide information about a specific software failure incident related to either a permanent or temporary duration. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The articles do not mention any specific software crash incidents.
(b) omission: The articles do not mention any specific instances of the system omitting to perform its intended functions.
(c) timing: The articles do not mention any specific instances of the system performing its intended functions too late or too early.
(d) value: The articles do not mention any specific instances of the system performing its intended functions incorrectly.
(e) byzantine: The articles do not mention any specific instances of the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The articles discuss the development of a new 'hack-proof' security system for vehicles to prevent cybercriminals from gaining access to the car's computer systems. This new security system involves a series of firewalls, unique data keys, and a triple-check system similar to that used by banks to protect online banking. This behavior of enhancing security to prevent hacking attempts can be considered as a proactive measure to prevent potential software failures related to security breaches [45024]. |