| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the FBI's attempt to unlock the iPhone 5c of Rizwan Syed Farook using the NAND mirroring technique could be considered as having happened again within the same organization (FBI). The incident involved the FBI ordering Apple to help unlock the iPhone, claiming they had no other way of accessing the device's data. However, a researcher, Sergei Skorobogatov, demonstrated a method known as NAND mirroring that bypassed the iPhone 5c's PIN code security measures, proving the FBI's initial claims wrong [47930].
(b) The software failure incident related to the FBI's attempt to unlock the iPhone 5c of Rizwan Syed Farook using the NAND mirroring technique could also be seen as a case where a similar incident has happened at other organizations or with their products and services. This incident highlighted the ongoing debate between law enforcement agencies and tech companies regarding encryption and access to locked devices. Additionally, the technique of NAND mirroring was discussed in the context of Apple's dispute with the FBI, indicating a broader concern about the security of mobile devices and the potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by skilled hackers [47930]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the case of the FBI's demand for Apple to help unlock the iPhone 5c of Rizwan Syed Farook. The FBI claimed it had no other way of accessing the device's data and convinced a California magistrate to order Apple to assist based on the argument that there was no other option to break the device's security protections. However, researcher Sergei Skorobogatov demonstrated a method known as NAND mirroring that bypassed the iPhone 5c's PIN code security measures, proving the FBI wrong in their claim that the technique wouldn't work. This incident highlights a failure in the design phase where the system development and security measures were not robust enough to prevent unauthorized access [47930].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be observed in the FBI's handling of the situation. Despite the availability of alternative methods like NAND mirroring to access the iPhone 5c's data, the FBI insisted on its demand for Apple to create a new version of firmware to bypass the PIN code restrictions. This insistence on a specific solution without considering alternative operational approaches or the potential risks involved in the operation of the device demonstrates a failure in the operation phase of handling the software failure incident [47930]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident discussed in the article is related to the boundary of the system itself. The failure occurred due to a vulnerability within the iPhone 5c's security measures, specifically related to the NAND memory chip and the PIN code security measures [47930]. The incident involved a method known as NAND mirroring, which allowed for bypassing the iPhone 5c's security measures by manipulating the data on the memory chip [47930]. This failure was a result of internal system vulnerabilities and weaknesses that were exploited by the researcher to demonstrate the flaw in the security system of the iPhone 5c.
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident discussed in the article does not involve contributing factors that originate from outside the system. The failure was primarily due to internal vulnerabilities within the iPhone 5c's security measures and the manipulation of the NAND memory chip to bypass the device's security protections [47930]. There is no indication in the article that external factors played a significant role in the software failure incident. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is primarily related to non-human actions. The failure occurred due to a method known as NAND mirroring, which bypassed the iPhone 5c's PIN code security measures. This technique involved physically manipulating the hardware of the phone, specifically the NAND memory chip, to extract and rewrite data in order to bypass the security protections [47930].
(b) Human actions also played a role in this incident. The FBI initially ordered Apple to help unlock the iPhone 5c of Rizwan Syed Farook, leading to a legal battle between the two parties. The FBI's claim that the NAND mirroring technique wouldn't work was challenged by researchers, indicating a potential misjudgment or lack of thorough research on the FBI's part. Additionally, the FBI eventually dropped its case against Apple after finding an alternative method to break the phone's security, suggesting a shift in human actions and decisions [47930]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to hardware. The incident involved a hardware hacking technique known as NAND mirroring that bypassed the iPhone 5c's PIN code security measures. The researcher, Sergei Skorobogatov, demonstrated how he removed the NAND memory chip from the phone's circuit board and used hardware methods to access the device's data [47930]. The failure was due to contributing factors originating in hardware manipulation and not in the software itself. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is non-malicious. The incident involved a security researcher, Sergei Skorobogatov, demonstrating a method known as NAND mirroring to bypass the iPhone 5c's PIN code security measures. Skorobogatov's research aimed to show that the FBI's claim that the technique wouldn't work was mistaken or potentially an attempt to set a legal precedent to force tech companies to cooperate in hacking their own devices [47930]. The incident was driven by the researcher's efforts to prove the feasibility of a hardware-based method to access the device's data, rather than any malicious intent to harm the system. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
The software failure incident described in the article was related to poor decisions made by the FBI in their approach to accessing the data on the iPhone 5c of Rizwan Syed Farook. The FBI initially claimed they had no other way of accessing the device's data and convinced a California magistrate to order Apple to help unlock the phone based on this argument. However, researchers like Sergei Skorobogatov demonstrated a method known as NAND mirroring that bypassed the iPhone 5c's security measures, proving the FBI wrong in their assertions. This incident highlighted the FBI's lack of research and due diligence in exploring alternative methods, indicating that setting a legal precedent for tech companies' cooperation with law enforcement was more important to them than finding the most effective solution [47930]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The articles do not mention any software failure incident related to development incompetence.
(b) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is more related to accidental factors rather than development incompetence. The incident involved the FBI's claim that a certain technique to bypass the iPhone 5c's security measures was infeasible, which was proven wrong by a researcher through a method known as NAND mirroring. This accidental failure was due to the FBI's lack of research and due diligence, as well as their attempt to set a legal precedent for tech companies to cooperate in hacking their own devices [47930]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident discussed in the article is more related to a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. The incident involved the FBI's attempt to unlock the iPhone 5c of Rizwan Syed Farook, an ISIS supporter involved in the San Bernardino attack. The FBI initially claimed it had no other way of accessing the device's data and sought Apple's help. However, researcher Sergei Skorobogatov demonstrated a method known as NAND mirroring that bypassed the iPhone 5c's PIN code security measures, proving the FBI wrong [47930].
The temporary nature of this software failure incident is evident in the fact that the FBI eventually dropped its case against Apple after declaring that one of its contractors had found a way to break the phone's security. This indicates that the failure was not permanent but rather temporary, as a solution was eventually found to unlock the device [47930]. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident is more related to security vulnerabilities and bypassing encryption mechanisms on the iPhone 5c [47930].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, it revolves around the ability to bypass security measures on the iPhone 5c [47930].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early. It is more about the ability to access data on the iPhone 5c by bypassing security measures [47930].
(d) value: The software failure incident is not about the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. It is more focused on the security vulnerabilities that allowed for bypassing the encryption on the iPhone 5c [47930].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. It is more about the security implications of being able to bypass the iPhone 5c's security mechanisms [47930].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability exploit. It involves the successful bypassing of the iPhone 5c's PIN code security measures through a method known as NAND mirroring, demonstrating a flaw in the device's security design [47930]. |