Incident: Mirai Botnet DDoS Attack on Brian Krebs' Website

Published Date: 2016-10-06

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the Mirai botnet and the DDoS attack happened in September 2016 as per the article published on October 6, 2016 [Article 48825].
System 1. Mirai botnet [48825] 2. Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as routers, IP cameras, and digital video recorders (DVRs) [48825]
Responsible Organization 1. The Mirai botnet, specifically its author, was responsible for causing the software failure incident by launching DDoS attacks using compromised IoT devices and default passwords [48825].
Impacted Organization 1. OVH service provider [48825] 2. Brian Krebs' website 'Krebs on Security' [48825]
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was the Mirai botnet, which used 61 username and password combinations to attempt 'brute-force' hacks into thousands of devices around the world, leading to a massive DDoS attack [48825]. 2. The failure incident was also caused by the release of the Mirai botnet's source code along with instructions for its configuration and set-up, enabling similar threats to potentially rise [48825].
Non-software Causes 1. The failure incident was caused by a DDoS attack using networks of computers controlled by hackers [48825]. 2. The attack was facilitated by default passwords found widely among household devices, which were used to carry out the DDoS attack [48825]. 3. The attack was launched with the help of a botnet that enslaved a large number of hacked Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as routers, IP cameras, and DVRs [48825].
Impacts 1. The Mirai botnet, one of the networks involved in recent cyberattacks, used 61 username and password combinations to attempt 'brute-force' hacks into thousands of devices worldwide, leading to a massive DDoS attack [48825]. 2. The DDoS attack targeted the website of industry expert Brian Krebs, resulting in a record-breaking attack of approximately 665 Gigabits of traffic per second, causing the site to be bombarded and overwhelmed [48825]. 3. The attack on KrebsOnSecurity was twice as big as any previous attacks seen by the security team, indicating the severity and impact of the incident [48825]. 4. The attack utilized a botnet with capabilities that were unprecedented and not seen before, indicating a new level of threat in the cybersecurity landscape [48825]. 5. The attack traffic was designed to look like generic routing encapsulation (GRE) data packets, which was an unusual method of carrying out the attack, adding complexity to the incident [48825].
Preventions 1. Implementing strong password policies and avoiding the use of default or common passwords on devices could have prevented the Mirai botnet attack [48825]. 2. Regularly updating firmware and software on IoT devices to patch vulnerabilities that could be exploited by botnets like Mirai could have helped prevent the attack [48825]. 3. Enhancing network security measures to detect and block unusual or malicious traffic patterns, such as the GRE data packets used in the DDoS attack, could have mitigated the impact of the incident [48825].
Fixes 1. Implementing strong password policies and encouraging users to change default passwords on devices [48825] 2. Regularly updating firmware and software on IoT devices to patch vulnerabilities [48825] 3. Enhancing network security measures to detect and prevent DDoS attacks [48825]
References 1. Mirai botnet author 2. CSO (Chief Security Officer) 3. Brian Krebs 4. Akamai 5. Martin McKeay

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the Mirai botnet DDoS attack has happened again at the website of industry expert and former Washington Post writer Brian Krebs. The attack targeted his site 'Krebs on Security' and was described as an extremely large and unusual distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack [48825]. (b) The software failure incident related to the Mirai botnet DDoS attack has also happened at other organizations or with their products and services. Mirai has been linked to a DDoS attack against service provider OVH, indicating that similar attacks have targeted multiple organizations [48825].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the Mirai botnet attack mentioned in the articles. The Mirai botnet used default and commonly used passwords to carry out brute-force hacks into thousands of devices worldwide. These default passwords were found widely among household devices, indicating a design flaw in the security setup of these devices [48825]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the DDoS attack on the website of Brian Krebs. The attack, carried out by the Mirai botnet, overwhelmed the servers with simple requests for information, causing them to become overwhelmed and shut down. This failure was due to the operation of the botnet, which involved controlling a large number of hacked Internet of Things devices to launch the attack [48825].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) The software failure incident related to the Mirai botnet DDoS attack can be categorized as within_system. The Mirai botnet, which was one of the networks involved in the cyberattacks, used 61 username and password combinations to attempt 'brute-force' hacks into thousands of devices around the world [48825]. The botnet's author released the source code along with instructions for its configuration and set-up, indicating that the failure originated from within the system itself. Additionally, the attack targeted specific websites and individuals, suggesting an internal origin of the failure.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The Mirai botnet, a network of compromised IoT devices, was one of the networks involved in recent cyberattacks, specifically a DDoS attack [48825]. - Mirai botnet used 61 username and password combinations to attempt 'brute-force' hacks into thousands of devices around the world, exploiting default passwords commonly found in household devices [48825]. - Mirai botnet was powered by Internet of Things technology and had connected to nearly 400,000 devices at its peak [48825]. - The Mirai botnet attack against service provider OVH and the website of industry expert Brian Kreb was linked to the Mirai botnet [48825]. - The massive DDoS attack on Brian Kreb's website was designed to knock the site offline but was mitigated by the efforts of Akamai engineers [48825]. - The attack traffic on Brian Kreb's website reached approximately 665 Gigabits of traffic per second, making it one of the largest attacks ever seen [48825]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The Mirai botnet's author released the source code along with instructions for its configuration and set-up, potentially leading to similar threats in the future [48825]. - The Mirai botnet attack on Brian Kreb's website was thought to be in response to a blog post exposing hackers who carry out similar attacks for money [48825]. - The attack on Brian Kreb's website may have been related to his series on the takedown of the DDoS-for-hire service vDOS, which led to arrests of individuals involved in the service [48825]. - Israeli police arrested two individuals named in Mr. Krebs' report on the DDoS-for-hire service vDOS, and they were released on bail with restrictions on internet usage [48825].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The Mirai botnet, which was involved in recent cyberattacks, targeted nearly 400,000 devices using default passwords commonly found in household devices like routers and DVRs [48825]. - The attack on the website 'Krebs on Security' was a massive DDoS attack that bombarded the site with approximately 665 Gigabits of traffic per second, overwhelming the servers [48825]. - The attack traffic included traffic designed to look like generic routing encapsulation (GRE) data packets, which is a communication protocol used to establish a direct connection between networks [48825]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The Mirai botnet used 61 username and password combinations to attempt 'brute-force' hacks into thousands of devices around the world, indicating a software vulnerability in the devices' authentication systems [48825]. - The Mirai botnet's author released the source code along with instructions for its configuration and set-up, potentially leading to similar threats emerging in the future, highlighting a software-related security issue [48825]. - The DDoS attack on the website 'Krebs on Security' was carried out using a botnet with capabilities that were unprecedented, suggesting a sophisticated software-based attack strategy [48825].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident in the articles is malicious. The failure was caused by the Mirai botnet, which was used in DDoS attacks to bring down websites by overwhelming them with traffic. The botnet was created with the intent to harm systems and disrupt services, as it targeted various websites and services, including the website of industry expert Brian Krebs [48825]. The attack was described as a massive and unusual distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack designed to knock the site offline, indicating malicious intent behind the software failure incident. Additionally, the botnet's author released the source code and instructions for its configuration, potentially leading to similar threats in the future [48825].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be seen in the Mirai botnet attack incident. The Mirai botnet, one of the networks involved in the cyberattacks, used default and commonly used passwords to carry out brute-force hacks into thousands of devices worldwide [48825]. This indicates a poor decision on the part of device manufacturers and users who did not prioritize strong password security, leading to the success of the attack. (b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental decisions can be observed in the DDoS attack on the website of industry expert Brian Krebs. The attack, which was massive and unusual, targeted Krebs' website in response to a blog post he wrote exposing hackers involved in similar attacks for money [48825]. This unintended consequence of Krebs' actions led to the site being bombarded with traffic, requiring the intervention of Akamai engineers to keep it online.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence can be seen in the Mirai botnet attack mentioned in Article 48825. The Mirai botnet, one of two networks involved in recent cyberattacks, used 61 username and password combinations to attempt 'brute-force' hacks into thousands of devices around the world. These combinations included common default passwords like 'admin,' '1234,' 'password,' and 'guest,' which are widely found among household devices. The fact that these easily guessable passwords were successful in compromising a large number of devices indicates a lack of professional competence in implementing strong security measures [48825]. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors can be observed in the massive DDoS attack on the website 'Krebs on Security,' as reported in Article 48825. The attack, which reached approximately 665 Gigabits of traffic per second, was described as the largest attack ever seen by Akamai, the company protecting the site. The attack traffic was designed to look like generic routing encapsulation (GRE) data packets, a communication protocol used to establish direct connections between networks. This unusual method of attack, along with the massive scale of the assault, suggests that the attack was not accidental but rather a deliberate and sophisticated act carried out by hackers with advanced capabilities [48825].
Duration temporary The software failure incident related to the DDoS attack on the website 'Krebs on Security' can be categorized as a temporary failure. This incident was temporary as it was caused by the massive DDoS attack that bombarded the site with approximately 665 Gigabits of traffic per second, overwhelming the servers and causing the site to be knocked offline temporarily [48825]. The attack was successfully mitigated by the efforts of the engineers at Akamai, who protect the site from such attacks, allowing the website to remain online after the attack subsided.
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident related to the Mirai botnet can be categorized as a crash. The Mirai botnet caused a massive DDoS attack against various targets, including service provider OVH and the website of industry expert Brian Krebs. The attack overwhelmed the servers, causing them to become overwhelmed and shut down, which aligns with the definition of a crash where the system loses state and fails to perform its intended functions [48825]. (b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. The Mirai botnet, through the DDoS attack, omitted to perform the intended functions of the targeted servers by bombarding them with simple requests for information, causing them to become overwhelmed and shut down [48825]. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not align with a timing failure as there is no indication that the system performed its intended functions too late or too early in the context of the DDoS attack carried out by the Mirai botnet [48825]. (d) value: The software failure incident can be categorized as a value failure. The Mirai botnet performed its intended functions incorrectly by using 61 username and password combinations to attempt 'brute-force' hacks into thousands of devices around the world, causing a significant cybersecurity threat [48825]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine failure as there is no mention of the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions in the context of the Mirai botnet DDoS attack [48825]. (f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized as an 'other' behavior. The Mirai botnet's behavior of using default passwords and exploiting vulnerabilities in IoT devices to carry out cyberattacks is a unique form of failure that may not fit neatly into the defined categories of crash, omission, timing, value, or byzantine failures [48825].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure The software failure incident involving the Mirai botnet resulted in a massive DDoS attack against service provider OVH and the website of industry expert Brian Krebs. The attack targeted the website 'Krebs on Security' and was designed to knock the site offline. The attack bombarded the site with approximately 665 Gigabits of traffic per second, causing a significant disruption. Additionally, the incident led to a decrease in the number of connected devices to the Mirai botnet, indicating a disruption in the normal functioning of these devices [48825].
Domain information, health (a) The failed system was related to the information industry as it involved a DDoS attack on the website 'Krebs on Security' which is focused on cybersecurity and information sharing [48825]. (j) The health industry was indirectly impacted by the software failure incident as the attack targeted the website of a cybersecurity expert who may have covered topics related to healthcare cybersecurity [48825]. (m) The software failure incident was also related to the technology industry as it involved the Mirai botnet, which exploited vulnerabilities in Internet of Things (IoT) devices to carry out DDoS attacks [48825].

Sources

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