| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack on TCN's phone bank service occurred at TCN, a Utah-based company that provides phone banking software for political campaigns and activist groups [50002].
(b) The incident involving a DDOS attack on TCN's phone bank service is not explicitly mentioned to have happened at multiple organizations. The focus of the article is primarily on the attack on TCN and its impact on various political groups and campaigns. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 50002 was primarily due to a design-related factor introduced by the hackers' distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack on the phone bank service provided by TCN. The attack overwhelmed TCN's servers with malicious internet traffic, causing intermittent outages of the web-based software used for making get-out-the-vote phone calls. The attack exploited vulnerabilities in the system design, particularly through the use of a variation of the Mirai botnet software that targeted TCN's infrastructure [50002].
(b) Additionally, the software failure incident can also be attributed to an operational factor related to the misuse of the system. The hackers' operation of the DDOS attack on TCN's phone bank service disrupted the normal operation of the software, impacting the ability of volunteers and activists to access the calling scripts and contact lists necessary for making calls. This operational misuse of the system led to slowdowns and intermittent crashes of the software, affecting the effectiveness of voter-motivating activism calls during a crucial moment in the election season [50002]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident involving the DDOS attack on TCN's phone bank service was primarily caused by factors originating from within the system. The attack overwhelmed TCN's servers and periodically took its web-based software offline, affecting the ability of volunteers and activists to access the software for making get-out-the-vote phone calls [50002].
(b) outside_system: The DDOS attack on TCN's phone bank service was initiated by hackers from outside the system. The attack involved a variation of the Mirai botnet software and targeted TCN's servers with malicious internet traffic, leading to intermittent blockages of access to the software [50002]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 50002 was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack orchestrated by hackers. The attack overwhelmed the servers of the phone bank service, TCN, with malicious internet traffic, intermittently taking its web-based software offline and impacting the ability of volunteers and activists to access the software for making get-out-the-vote phone calls [50002].
(b) While the software failure incident was mainly caused by non-human actions, there were human actions involved in responding to the incident. TCN's response to the attack included efforts to filter out the attack traffic, increasing the number of proxy servers, and hiring an anti-DDOS security firm to help protect against future attacks [50002]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 50002 was not attributed to hardware issues but rather to a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack that overwhelmed the servers of the phone bank service provider, TCN. The attack involved malicious internet traffic that saturated TCN's internet connections, leading to intermittent outages of their web-based software [50002].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 50002 was primarily caused by a DDOS attack on the phone bank service provider, TCN. The attack targeted the software by overwhelming it with malicious internet traffic, leading to intermittent disruptions in accessing the software for making get-out-the-vote phone calls. The attack did not shut down the services completely but caused significant slowdowns and difficulties for volunteers and activists using the software [50002]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article was malicious in nature. It was a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack on the phone bank service provided by TCN, which was targeted by hackers with the intent to disrupt the service and impact political activities related to the US presidential election [50002]. The attack overwhelmed TCN's servers with malicious internet traffic, intermittently taking the web-based software offline and blocking volunteers and activists from accessing the software for making get-out-the-vote phone calls. The attack used a variation of the Mirai botnet software and involved DNS amplification, a technique to overwhelm the target with unwanted responses [50002]. The attack affected various political groups, including the Clinton campaign, NextGen Climate, Our Revolution, and MoveOn, showcasing the malicious intent behind the software failure incident [50002]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was not due to poor decisions but rather a deliberate attack by hackers. The incident was a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack on the phone bank service provided by TCN, which was politically motivated. The attackers overwhelmed TCN's servers with malicious internet traffic, impacting the availability of the web-based software used for making get-out-the-vote phone calls [50002].
(b) The software failure incident was not accidental but a targeted attack orchestrated by hackers using a variation of the Mirai botnet software. The attack was aimed at disrupting the phone banking service provided by TCN, affecting various political groups and organizations using the service for voter-motivating activism calls [50002]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
unknown |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article was not due to development incompetence but rather a deliberate attack by hackers using a variation of the Mirai botnet software to launch a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack on the phone bank service provided by TCN [50002].
(b) The software failure incident was accidental in the sense that it was not caused by any accidental factors but was a result of a politically motivated attack orchestrated by hackers targeting the phone bank service, which led to intermittent disruptions in accessing the software for making get-out-the-vote phone calls [50002]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was temporary. The distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack on TCN's phone bank service caused intermittent disruptions and slowdowns in accessing the software, but the service never went completely offline [50002]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident did not result in a complete shutdown of the services provided by TCN. Despite the overwhelming malicious internet traffic, TCN's services never went completely offline [50002].
(b) omission: The attack intermittently blocked volunteers and activists from accessing the software that listed contacts and offered calling scripts, rendering it unusable at times during a crucial moment for motivating voters [50002].
(c) timing: The attack on TCN's phone banking service occurred starting on Sunday night and continued for 24 hours, impacting the crucial day of making get-out-the-vote phone calls [50002].
(d) value: The software failure incident did not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Instead, it was more about the disruption caused by the overwhelming malicious internet traffic [50002].
(e) byzantine: The behavior of the software failure incident did not exhibit inconsistent responses or interactions. The attack primarily focused on overwhelming TCN's servers with malicious traffic, leading to intermittent blockages of access to the phone banking software [50002].
(f) other: The software failure incident involved a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack that saturated TCN's internet connections, leading to slowdowns and intermittent unavailability of the phone banking service. The attack utilized a variation of the Mirai botnet software and involved DNS amplification as a tactic to overwhelm the target [50002]. |