| Recurring |
unknown |
The article does not provide information about the software failure incident happening again at either the same organization or at multiple organizations. Therefore, the answer to this question is 'unknown'. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The security vulnerability exploited by the attack on iOS 9 was a result of a chain of security flaws, including an Airdrop bug and a vulnerability that allowed corporations to install their own custom apps on Apple's tightly restricted operating system. This design flaw allowed the attacker to install malicious apps on iPhones and Macs via Bluetooth-enabled Airdrop filesharing feature [51585].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. The attack demonstrated by the Australian security researcher Mark Dowd could be carried out by anyone within Bluetooth range of a target device with the Airdrop feature enabled. This means that the operation or misuse of the system, such as leaving Airdrop enabled in public places, could lead to the installation of malicious software on the victim's device [51585]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
The software failure incident described in the article [51585] involves contributing factors that originate both from within the system (within_system) and outside the system (outside_system).
1. **Within the System (within_system):**
- The vulnerability exploited by the attack was related to the Airdrop feature in iOS 9, which allowed for the installation of malicious apps on iPhones and Macs [51585].
- The attack took advantage of not only the Airdrop bug but also a vulnerability that allows corporations to install their own custom apps on Apple's operating system [51585].
- The attack could install an unapproved application on an iPhone that hasn't been jailbroken and disable the pop-up prompt that asks if the user wants to trust the program's author [51585].
2. **Outside the System (outside_system):**
- The attack was demonstrated by an Australian security researcher and consultant, Mark Dowd, who warned Apple about the security vulnerability [51585].
- The attack could be carried out by anyone within Bluetooth range of a target device with the Airdrop feature enabled [51585].
- Apple released a security update to address the vulnerabilities, indicating that the threat originated from outside the system [51585]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a security vulnerability in iOS 9 that allowed for a wireless hijack via Bluetooth range. The attack demonstrated by the Australian security researcher Mark Dowd took advantage of a vulnerability in the Airdrop feature of iOS, allowing for the installation of malicious apps on iPhones and Macs without the victim's interaction ([51585]).
(b) However, human actions are also involved in this incident as the security researcher Mark Dowd reported the vulnerability to Apple, which led to the patch being included in iOS 9. Additionally, the article mentions that Apple has released a security update for both the Macbook and iPhone attacks, indicating human intervention in addressing the issue ([51585]). |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the article is related to a vulnerability in iOS 9 that could allow an attacker to wirelessly hijack iPhones and Macs via their Bluetooth-enabled Airdrop filesharing feature. This vulnerability was identified by Australian security researcher Mark Dowd, who demonstrated how an attacker could install malicious apps on devices within Bluetooth range, even if the victim didn't tap "accept" for the offered file. The attack takes advantage of both the Airdrop bug in iOS and a vulnerability that allows the installation of custom apps on Apple's operating system [51585].
(b) The software failure incident is primarily due to contributing factors that originate in software, specifically vulnerabilities in iOS 9 that could be exploited to install malicious apps on iPhones and Macs. The attack demonstrated by Mark Dowd leverages these software vulnerabilities to plant malware on devices wirelessly via Bluetooth, highlighting the importance of software security patches and updates to mitigate such risks [51585]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The incident involved a security vulnerability in iOS 9 that could allow an attacker to wirelessly hijack iPhones and Macs within Bluetooth range and install malicious apps on them without the user's consent. The attack demonstrated by the security researcher Mark Dowd could plant malware on the devices, even if the victim didn't tap "accept" for the offered file. This malicious attack exploited vulnerabilities in Airdrop and allowed the installation of unapproved applications on iPhones, potentially leading to the implanting of malware [51585]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
accidental_decisions |
The software failure incident described in the article [51585] can be categorized under "accidental_decisions." The incident involved a security vulnerability in iOS 9 that allowed attackers to install malicious apps on iPhones and Macs via the Bluetooth-enabled Airdrop feature. The vulnerability was not intentionally introduced but was a mistake or unintended consequence of the software design. The incident was not a result of poor decisions but rather a flaw that was exploited by a security researcher to demonstrate the potential risk to Apple users. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 51585 was not due to development incompetence. The incident was a result of a security vulnerability in iOS 9 that allowed attackers to exploit the Airdrop feature to install malicious apps on iPhones and Macs wirelessly within Bluetooth range. The attack was demonstrated by security researcher Mark Dowd, who identified and reported the vulnerability to Apple. Apple released a security update to address the issue, indicating that the failure was not due to incompetence but rather a security flaw that needed to be patched [51585].
(b) The software failure incident described in Article 51585 was accidental in nature. The vulnerability that allowed attackers to exploit the Airdrop feature in iOS 9 was not intentionally introduced but was a result of a security flaw that could be exploited by miscreants within Bluetooth range. The attack demonstrated by Mark Dowd highlighted how the vulnerability could be used to install malicious apps on devices without the user's consent, indicating that the failure was accidental rather than intentional [51585]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article is temporary. The vulnerability in iOS 9 that allowed for the wireless hijacking of iPhones and Macs via Bluetooth was a specific issue that was addressed by a security patch. The incident was not a permanent failure but rather a temporary one that could be mitigated by upgrading to the patched versions of the operating systems [51585]. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and stops performing its intended functions. Instead, it focuses on a security vulnerability that could allow malicious apps to be installed on iPhones and Macs via the Bluetooth-enabled Airdrop feature [51585].
(b) omission: The incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). It is more about a security vulnerability that could lead to the installation of malicious apps on devices without user interaction [51585].
(c) timing: The failure is not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early. It is more about a security vulnerability that could allow attackers to plant malware on devices within Bluetooth range, even if the victim doesn't tap "accept" for the offered file [51585].
(d) value: The software failure incident is not about the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. It is more focused on a security vulnerability that could lead to the installation of unapproved applications on iPhones and Macs [51585].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. It is primarily about a security vulnerability that could allow attackers to exploit the Airdrop feature to install malicious apps on devices [51585].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability that allows for the unauthorized installation of apps on Apple devices, exploiting both the Airdrop feature and a vulnerability that allows corporations to install custom apps on Apple's restricted operating system. This behavior is not explicitly covered by the options (a) to (e) provided [51585]. |