| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in industrial control systems, specifically the Modicon Quantum PLC made by Schneider-Electric, has happened again within the same organization. The article mentions that Digital Bond, a computer security consultancy, released exploit modules targeting vulnerabilities in the Modicon Quantum system, including lack of authentication and backdoor accounts hard coded into the system [11372].
(b) The software failure incident has also happened at multiple organizations. The article highlights that the researchers have been warning for years about security issues in industrial control systems, and the Stuxnet worm incident in Iran's nuclear facilities brought widespread attention to these vulnerabilities. It is mentioned that PLC vendors like Siemens and Schneider, among others, have been criticized for not taking sufficient steps to secure their systems despite knowing about the vulnerabilities [11372]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. Researchers released exploits that attack common design vulnerabilities in a computer component used to control critical infrastructure, such as refineries and factories. These exploits target the Modicon Quantum programmable logic controller made by Schneider-Electric, exploiting the fact that the PLC doesn't require a computer communicating with it to authenticate itself or any commands it sends, essentially trusting any computer that can talk to the PLC [11372].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. The exploits released by researchers allow an attacker to send a "stop" command to the PLC or replace the ladder logic in a Modicon Quantum PLC to take control of the system. These actions can disrupt the operation of critical infrastructures controlled by these PLCs, showcasing the impact of operational misuse or unauthorized access [11372]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is primarily within_system. The vulnerabilities and exploits discussed in the articles target specific design flaws and security weaknesses within the Modicon Quantum programmable logic controller (PLC) made by Schneider-Electric. These vulnerabilities include the lack of authentication, presence of backdoor accounts, plaintext storage of web server passwords, and the ability for an attacker to easily replace legitimate ladder logic with malicious commands [11372]. The exploits were created by security researchers to demonstrate the ease of compromise and potential catastrophic impact of these vulnerabilities, highlighting the fragility and insecurity of these devices [11372].
(b) Additionally, the articles mention that the software failure incident is influenced by outside_system factors. For example, the Stuxnet worm attack on Iran's nuclear centrifuges in 2010 served as a precedent for demonstrating how digital code can create physical damage in critical infrastructure systems. The Stuxnet attack, which targeted a PLC model made by Siemens, exploited the lack of authentication required to upload rogue ladder logic, similar to the vulnerabilities found in the Schneider PLC [11372]. This external event contributed to the increased attention on industrial control system security vulnerabilities and the need for PLC vendors to address these issues. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is related to non-human actions. The exploits targeting the Modicon Quantum programmable logic controller made by Schneider-Electric were created by researchers to demonstrate vulnerabilities in the system, such as the lack of authentication and the presence of backdoor accounts [11372].
(b) The software failure incident can also be attributed to human actions. The researchers intentionally created and released the exploits targeting the Schneider PLC to highlight the security flaws and vulnerabilities in industrial control systems. Additionally, the release of these exploits was aimed at pressuring companies like Schneider into addressing serious design flaws they had neglected to fix [11372]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where researchers released exploits targeting vulnerabilities in a computer component, specifically the Modicon Quantum programmable logic controller made by Schneider-Electric, which is a hardware device used to control critical infrastructure like refineries and factories [11372].
(b) The software failure incident related to software can be observed in the same article where the exploits created by security researchers targeted vulnerabilities in the software of the Modicon Quantum PLC, allowing attackers to send malicious commands to take control of the PLC or halt its operations [11372]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The exploits released by researchers target common design vulnerabilities in the Modicon Quantum programmable logic controller made by Schneider-Electric, which is a key component used to control critical infrastructure such as refineries, factories, and other facilities [11372]. The exploits allow attackers to send malicious commands to the PLC, take control of the PLC, and replace legitimate ladder logic with malicious commands without actually sabotaging the device. These actions demonstrate the potential catastrophic impact of vulnerabilities in industrial control systems and highlight the fragility and insecurity of these devices [11372].
Additionally, the release of these exploits by the researchers was aimed at pressuring companies like Schneider into fixing serious design flaws and vulnerabilities they have neglected to address. The exploits were also made available in Metasploit, a penetration testing tool, which can be used by hackers to quickly find and gain access to vulnerable systems [11372]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
- The software failure incident involving the exploits targeting the Modicon Quantum PLC made by Schneider-Electric was a result of poor decisions in the design and implementation of the system. The vulnerabilities exploited in the PLC, such as the lack of authentication, presence of backdoor accounts, and plaintext storage of web server passwords, were serious design flaws that were known but neglected by the vendors [11372].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
- The software failure incident was not due to accidental decisions or unintended mistakes but rather a deliberate demonstration of vulnerabilities in the Modicon Quantum PLC by security researchers to highlight the fragility and insecurity of critical infrastructure systems [11372]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as it discusses the vulnerabilities in the Modicon Quantum programmable logic controller (PLC) made by Schneider-Electric. The vulnerabilities, including the lack of authentication, presence of backdoor accounts, and plaintext storage of web server passwords, indicate a lack of professional competence in designing secure systems [11372].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is more aligned with a permanent failure. The vulnerabilities and exploits discovered in the Modicon Quantum programmable logic controller (PLC) by researchers have highlighted serious design flaws and vulnerabilities that have long been neglected by the manufacturers. These vulnerabilities, such as the lack of authentication, presence of backdoor accounts, and plaintext storage of passwords, indicate fundamental weaknesses in the system that can be exploited by attackers to take control of critical infrastructure systems [11372].
The fact that these vulnerabilities have been known for some time and have not been adequately addressed by the PLC vendors suggests that the failure is more permanent in nature, as the underlying issues have not been fully resolved to prevent future attacks or breaches. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the incident involves intentional exploits targeting vulnerabilities in the Modicon Quantum programmable logic controller (PLC) [11372].
(b) omission: The incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Rather, the exploits target specific vulnerabilities in the PLC to manipulate its behavior [11372].
(c) timing: The failure is not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early. It is about exploiting vulnerabilities in the PLC to gain control or disrupt its operations [11372].
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly due to vulnerabilities that allow attackers to send malicious commands to the PLC, potentially leading to unauthorized control or disruption of critical infrastructure operations [11372].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. It is more about exploiting known vulnerabilities in the PLC to demonstrate the ease of compromise and potential catastrophic impact on critical infrastructure systems [11372].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security breach or vulnerability exploitation. It involves attackers leveraging design vulnerabilities in the Modicon Quantum PLC to send unauthorized commands, potentially compromising the control and operation of critical infrastructure systems [11372]. |