| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to robbing ATMs using malware on Windows XP has happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. The incident involved a pair of German security researchers demonstrating how ATMs running Windows XP could be hacked using malware to extract cash [55750]. The incident highlighted the vulnerability of ATMs to high-tech theft due to outdated and insecure technology still being used by many banks.
(b) The software failure incident has also happened at multiple organizations or with their products and services. The malware discovered in the wild on undisclosed ATMs was a significant threat, indicating that various banks using similar technology were at risk of being targeted by sophisticated criminal groups [55750]. The incident raised concerns about the widespread use of vulnerable technology in ATMs globally, making them susceptible to similar attacks. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to the design phase. The incident involved malware that was specifically created to target ATMs running on Windows XP-based systems. The malware was designed to rewrite the operating system's registry, allowing attackers to gain direct manual access to the machine's money-dispensing functions. The malware was sophisticated, clean, and had gone through several generations of improvements, indicating a significant investment of time and money by the perpetrators [55750].
(b) The software failure incident can also be linked to the operation phase. The attackers exploited vulnerabilities in the ATMs' operation by physically accessing the machines, cutting a piece from the chassis to expose the USB port, and then forcing the ATM to reboot to load the malware from a USB stick. This operation-based attack method allowed the attackers to extract cash from the compromised ATMs [55750]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is primarily within the system. The malware was specifically designed to target ATMs running on Windows XP and exploit vulnerabilities within the operating system and the ATM's software [55750]. The malware allowed attackers to gain direct manual access to the machine's money-dispensing functions, indicating a failure within the system's security measures. Additionally, the malware was created with sophisticated programming skills and went through several generations of improvements, suggesting a deep understanding of the ATM's internal workings [55750].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involved factors originating from outside the system. The attackers had to physically access the ATM by cutting a piece from its chassis to expose the USB port and insert their malware-laden USB stick. This physical access to the ATM is an external factor that contributed to the success of the attack [55750]. Additionally, the researchers mentioned that the malware was discovered in the wild on an undisclosed number of ATMs, indicating that the attack was not limited to a single isolated incident but had broader implications across multiple ATM systems [55750]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is primarily due to non-human actions. The incident involved exploiting vulnerabilities in ATMs running Windows XP by using malware stored on a USB stick to rewrite the operating system's registry, allowing unauthorized access to the money-dispensing functions of the machines [55750]. The malware was designed to extract cash from the ATMs rather than intercepting customer data like PIN numbers or account information [55750].
(b) However, human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. The malware used in the attack was created by a group of individuals with a profound knowledge of ATMs, suggesting a deliberate effort to exploit the vulnerabilities for financial gain. The team of researchers who analyzed the malware highlighted that the code was clean, written in a sophisticated style, and had gone through several generations of improvements, indicating a significant investment of time and resources by the perpetrators [55750]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is related to hardware. The incident involved exploiting vulnerabilities in ATMs running Windows XP by physically accessing the machines, cutting a piece from the chassis to expose the USB port, and then using malware on a USB stick to rewrite the operating system's registry and gain access to the money-dispensing functions [55750]. This attack method targeted the hardware components of the ATMs to carry out the theft.
(b) The software failure incident is also related to software. The malware used in the attack was specifically designed to target the cash-delivery software of a particular bank running on Windows XP-based systems. The malware allowed for direct manual access to the money-dispensing functions of the ATMs, indicating a software vulnerability that was exploited by the attackers [55750]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The objective of the software failure incident was malicious. The incident involved a sophisticated malware attack on ATMs running Windows XP, allowing attackers to extract cash from the machines by exploiting vulnerabilities in the system [55750]. The malware was specifically designed to give direct manual access to the money-dispensing functions of the ATMs, indicating a clear intent to harm the system and steal money. The attackers invested significant time and resources into creating the malware, demonstrating a deliberate and malicious objective behind the software failure incident. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was not due to poor decisions but rather due to the vulnerability of ATMs running on outdated technology like Windows XP. The incident was a result of high-tech criminal groups exploiting the weaknesses in the ATM systems, indicating a lack of proactive security measures by banks in upgrading their technology [55750].
(b) The incident was not accidental but a deliberate attack orchestrated by sophisticated criminals who invested time and resources in creating the malware to exploit the ATMs. The malware was designed to extract cash from the machines rather than steal customer information like PIN numbers or account data, indicating a specific focus on immediate financial gain [55750]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is related to development incompetence. The incident involved a sophisticated malware attack on ATMs running Windows XP, exploiting vulnerabilities in the old operating system and the ATM software. The malware was designed to allow attackers to extract cash from the machines by manipulating the system through a USB port and a hidden menu installed by the malware [55750].
(b) The software failure incident was not accidental but rather a deliberate and well-planned attack by a group with significant programming skills and knowledge of ATMs. The malware was created with the intention of extracting cash from the ATMs, indicating a purposeful and targeted attack rather than an accidental failure [55750]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is more of a permanent nature. The malware discovered on the ATMs running Windows XP was a deliberate attack that allowed criminals to repeatedly rob banks by exploiting vulnerabilities in the system. The malware was sophisticated, well-written, and had gone through several generations of improvements, indicating a significant investment of time and money by the attackers [55750]. Additionally, the incident highlighted the ongoing vulnerability of ATMs running outdated technology, suggesting that the risk of such attacks will persist as long as these vulnerabilities remain unaddressed. |
| Behaviour |
crash, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article involves a crash where the ATM's operating system is rewritten by malware, causing the system to lose its state and enabling unauthorized access to the money-dispensing functions [55750].
(b) omission: The incident does not specifically mention a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s).
(c) timing: The incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early.
(d) value: The software failure incident falls under the category of a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, as the malware allows unauthorized access to the ATM's money-dispensing functions [55750].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not describe a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited in this software failure incident is unauthorized access and manipulation of the ATM's functions by exploiting vulnerabilities in the system through malware injection [55750]. |