| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to weakened encryption using the Dual EC DRBG algorithm happened at RSA. The incident involved RSA arranging a contract with the NSA to use a mathematically weaker formula in its products, creating a potential "back door" for cracking encrypted messages. This incident led to concerns about the security of RSA's products and services [Article 55589].
(b) The software failure incident involving the Dual EC DRBG algorithm also impacted other organizations that used RSA's Bsafe software or security toolkits. The algorithm was made the default method for generating numbers in RSA's Bsafe software, which was then issued to other companies. This means that the weakened encryption system affected not only RSA but also potentially other organizations that relied on RSA's security solutions [Article 55589]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. It is reported that RSA allegedly arranged a $10m contract to use a mathematically weaker formula in its products, creating a "back door" for cracking encrypted messages or communications [Article 55589]. This decision to use a weakened encryption system, Dual EC DRBG, as the default in their security toolkits was made in 2004 as part of an industry-wide effort to develop newer, stronger methods of encryption. However, concerns were raised about the algorithm having a "back door" in it, indicating a failure in the design phase of the system development process.
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. It is mentioned that most people stick with the defaults in any software they use, including in cryptography. The fact that the weakened encryption system was set as the default method for generating numbers in RSA's Bsafe software indicates a failure in the operation phase, where users unknowingly relied on a system with compromised security due to the default settings [Article 55589]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the weakened encryption system involving the Dual EC DRBG algorithm can be categorized as within_system. RSA, the security company, made the decision to use Dual EC DRBG as the default in its BSafe toolkits in 2004 as part of an industry-wide effort to develop stronger encryption methods [55589]. The algorithm itself was developed by the NSA and approved by NIST in 2006. However, concerns were raised by researchers about a potential "back door" in the algorithm, indicating that the flaw originated within the system itself. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is related to non-human_actions, specifically the use of a weakened encryption system known as Dual EC DRBG, which was developed by the NSA and incorporated into RSA's products. This weakened encryption system had a flaw that made it easier for encrypted messages or communications to be cracked. The algorithm was approved by NIST but later concerns were raised about a potential "back door" in it, leading to recommendations against its use for generating secure content [Article 55589].
(b) The software failure incident could also be attributed to human_actions, as it was alleged that RSA arranged a $10m contract with the NSA to use the mathematically weaker Dual EC DRBG algorithm in its products, potentially creating a "back door" for cracking encrypted messages. However, RSA denied knowingly weakening the encryption and stated that they made the decision to use Dual EC DRBG as the default in their toolkits in 2004 as part of an industry-wide effort to develop stronger encryption methods. The exact details of any potential contract and the knowledge about the flaw in the random number generator are not entirely clear from the information provided [Article 55589]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The software failure incident reported in the articles is not directly attributed to hardware issues. The incident revolves around the allegation that RSA arranged a contract with the NSA to weaken the encryption used in its products, specifically involving a flawed random number generator known as Dual EC DRBG [Article 55589].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident reported in the articles is primarily attributed to contributing factors originating in software. Specifically, the incident involves the use of a mathematically weaker formula in RSA's products, which could create a "back door" for cracking encrypted messages or communications. This weakness in the encryption system, particularly the Dual EC DRBG algorithm, was allegedly introduced as part of a contract with the NSA, highlighting a software-related issue [Article 55589]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is malicious. The incident involved RSA allegedly arranging a $10m contract with the NSA to use a mathematically weaker formula in its products, creating a "back door" for cracking encrypted messages or communications [Article 55589]. This action was seen as intentionally weakening the encryption system, which could harm the security and privacy of users relying on RSA's products. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
The software failure incident described in the articles seems to align more with the category of poor_decisions. The incident involved RSA allegedly arranging a $10m contract with the NSA to use a mathematically weaker formula in its products, creating a potential "back door" for cracking encrypted messages. This decision to incorporate a known flawed random number generator into its encryption libraries could be seen as a poor decision that compromised the security of the products [Article 55589]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article. It is reported that the security company RSA allegedly arranged a $10m contract with the NSA to use a mathematically weaker formula in its products, creating a "back door" for cracking encrypted messages. This decision to use a flawed random number generator, Dual EC DRBG, as the default method for generating numbers in its Bsafe software was made in 2004 [Article 55589]. This choice was part of an industry-wide effort to develop stronger encryption methods, but it later emerged that the NSA had worked to weaken the random number generation system, making communications easier to crack. The fact that RSA did not recognize the weakness in the algorithm at the time of the contract suggests a level of development incompetence in assessing the security implications of their choices.
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also present in the article. RSA denies knowingly weakening the encryption in its products as part of a secret contract with the NSA. The company claims that it had a trusted relationship with the NSA and that the decision to use Dual EC DRBG as the default method was made in the context of efforts to strengthen encryption, not weaken it. However, the revelation that the NSA had worked to weaken the random number generation system, as disclosed by Edward Snowden, indicates that the consequences of this decision were accidental in terms of the actual security implications that emerged later on [Article 55589]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles seems to be more of a permanent failure. The incident involved RSA allegedly arranging a contract with the NSA to use a mathematically weaker formula in its products, creating a potential "back door" for cracking encrypted messages. This decision to weaken the encryption system by incorporating a flawed random number generator into its BSAFE encryption libraries was a deliberate action taken in the past [Article 55589].
(b) The temporary aspect of the failure could be seen in the fact that the weakness in the random number generator used by RSA's products was not immediately known or widely disclosed. Clear details about the weakness only emerged in the past few months, even though the alleged contract with the NSA would have been undertaken at least six years ago. This indicates that the full extent of the failure and its implications may not have been immediately apparent or widely understood [Article 55589]. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The issue here is related to encryption weakening and the use of a flawed random number generator [Article 55589].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The focus is on the intentional weakening of encryption by using a known flawed random number generator [Article 55589].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not about the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The issue is related to the deliberate use of a weakened encryption system, which was allegedly part of a secret contract with the NSA [Article 55589].
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Specifically, the use of a flawed random number generator in the encryption system could compromise the security of communications by creating a potential "back door" for cracking encrypted messages [Article 55589].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The focus is on the intentional weakening of encryption through the use of a compromised random number generator [Article 55589].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a deliberate act of weakening encryption by incorporating a known flawed random number generator into the system. This action raises concerns about the security and integrity of the encryption methods used by RSA products [Article 55589]. |