| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) has faced previous software glitches, including 600,000 transactions being delayed five months ago due to computer failures. Additionally, the company was fined £56m last year for IT difficulties that locked customers out of their accounts [57094].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article does not mention any other organizations experiencing similar software failure incidents. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident at Royal Bank of Scotland was attributed to faulty computer settings established to identify the owners of dormant accounts. The bank wrongly advised some customers that they did not hold a dormant account with them, leading to the denial of almost a quarter of a million pounds of customer money. This issue arose from system development and procedures to operate the system [57094].
(b) The software failure incident also involved the operation of the system, as customers were given erroneous information when trying to access their money via the Mylostaccount website. This operation-related failure led to customers being misinformed about their account status, requiring them to visit their local branch with ID to reclaim their outstanding balance [57094]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident at the Royal Bank of Scotland was attributed to faulty computer settings established to identify the owners of dormant accounts. The bank admitted that they wrongly advised some customers about the status of their accounts, leading to the denial of almost a quarter of a million pounds of customer money. This internal issue within the system resulted in the need to return cash to affected customers and apologize for the mistake [57094].
(b) outside_system: The wider outcry about the amount of money being held in inactive accounts by various lenders led to the establishment of a free website, Mylostaccount.org.uk, by the British Bankers’ Association. RBS faced the threat of an investigation by the Financial Conduct Authority into how its software provided erroneous information to customers trying to access money via the Mylostaccount website. This external factor of industry standards and regulatory oversight contributed to the fallout from the software failure incident [57094]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was attributed to non-human actions, specifically faulty computer settings established to identify the owners of dormant accounts at the Royal Bank of Scotland. The bank admitted that the mistake in denying sitting on almost a quarter of a million pounds of customer money was due to these faulty computer settings, which led to incorrect advice given to customers regarding their dormant accounts [57094].
(b) While the software failure incident was primarily caused by non-human actions, there were also human actions involved in the aftermath. The bank took steps to correct the error as soon as it was discovered, apologized to affected customers, and initiated the process of returning the cash to around 4,500 customers. Additionally, the bank spokesperson mentioned that affected customers were being asked to visit their local branch with ID to reclaim their outstanding balance, indicating human actions in rectifying the situation [57094]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article mentions that RBS blamed the latest setback on faulty computer settings established to identify the owners of dormant accounts, indicating that the failure originated from hardware-related issues [57094].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The article specifically states that RBS admitted to wrongly advising some customers due to faulty computer settings, highlighting that the failure originated from software-related factors [57094]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident at Royal Bank of Scotland was non-malicious. The failure was attributed to faulty computer settings established to identify the owners of dormant accounts, which led to incorrect information being provided to customers trying to access their money [57094]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident at Royal Bank of Scotland was attributed to poor decisions made regarding faulty computer settings established to identify the owners of dormant accounts. The bank wrongly advised some customers that they did not hold a dormant account, leading to the denial of almost a quarter of a million pounds of customer money. This poor decision resulted in the need to return cash to 4,500 customers and apologize for the mistake [57094].
(b) The software failure incident at Royal Bank of Scotland can also be linked to accidental decisions or mistakes. The bank admitted that it provided erroneous information to customers trying to access money via the Mylostaccount website due to faulty computer settings. This accidental decision led to customers being misinformed about the status of their accounts, requiring corrective actions to rectify the error [57094]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the case of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) where faulty computer settings were established to identify the owners of dormant accounts. This led to the bank wrongly advising some customers that they did not hold a dormant account with RBS, resulting in almost a quarter of a million pounds of customer money being held incorrectly. The RBS spokesperson acknowledged the mistake and mentioned that steps were taken to correct the error [57094].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also highlighted in the same case of RBS. The erroneous information provided to customers trying to access their money via the Mylostaccount website was due to faulty computer settings, which were not intentionally set up to mislead customers. The bank took steps to rectify the error as soon as it was discovered, indicating that the incident was accidental rather than deliberate [57094]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident mentioned in the article is more of a temporary nature rather than permanent. The article describes the failure as a result of faulty computer settings established to identify the owners of dormant accounts at the Royal Bank of Scotland. It was a specific issue related to providing incorrect information to customers trying to access their money via the Mylostaccount website. The bank took steps to correct the error as soon as it was discovered and is actively working to return the cash to affected customers [57094]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value |
(a) The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash. The article mentions that the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) experienced a setback due to faulty computer settings that wrongly advised some customers about their dormant accounts, leading to the system losing its state and not performing its intended function of correctly identifying the account owners. This resulted in the need for RBS to take corrective steps and return cash to affected customers [57094].
(b) The software failure incident can also be linked to omission. The article highlights that the faulty computer settings omitted to correctly identify the owners of dormant accounts, resulting in incorrect advice given to customers who were trying to access their funds. This omission led to the need for RBS to apologize to customers and take corrective measures to rectify the mistake [57094].
(d) Additionally, the software failure incident can be associated with a value failure. The system performed its intended function incorrectly by providing erroneous information to customers about the status of their dormant accounts. This incorrect information led to customer confusion and necessitated RBS to write to all affected customers, asking them to visit their local branch with ID to reclaim their outstanding balance [57094]. |