| Recurring |
unknown |
The articles do not provide information about the software failure incident happening again at either the same organization (one_organization) or at multiple organizations (multiple_organization). |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to the design phase. The incident involved the detection of a malware code associated with the Russian hacking operation within the system of a Vermont utility. The code was found in a laptop that was not connected to the organization's grid systems, highlighting vulnerabilities in the nation's electrical grid [58070]. The incident was not a result of the operation or misuse of the system but rather a design flaw that allowed the malware to infiltrate the utility's computer system. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to both within_system and outside_system factors.
(a) within_system: The incident involved the detection of a malware code associated with the Russian hacking operation within the system of a Vermont utility, Burlington Electric. The malware code was found in a laptop that was not connected to the organization's grid systems, indicating an internal breach within the system itself [58070].
(b) outside_system: The incident was also influenced by external factors as it was part of a larger Russian hacking operation dubbed Grizzly Steppe. The Russian hackers did not actively use the code to disrupt operations, but the discovery raised fears that Russian government hackers are actively trying to penetrate the U.S. electrical grid, indicating external threats to the system [58070]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to non-human actions. The incident involved a malware code associated with the Russian hacking operation Grizzly Steppe being detected within the system of a Vermont utility. The code was found in a laptop that was not connected to the organization's grid systems, indicating that the malware was introduced into the system without human participation [58070].
(b) Human actions also played a role in this incident as the Russian hackers were actively trying to penetrate the grid to carry out potential attacks. Additionally, the hackers used fraudulent emails to trick recipients into revealing passwords, showing a level of human involvement in the cyberattack [58070]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is not attributed to hardware issues. The incident involved a malware code associated with the Russian hacking operation being detected within the system of a Vermont utility, which was not connected to the grid systems. The malware code was found in a laptop that was not attached to the organization's grid systems, indicating that the failure originated from software-related vulnerabilities rather than hardware issues [58070].
(b) The software failure incident in the article is directly related to software issues. Specifically, the incident involved the detection of a malware code associated with the Russian hacking operation within the system of a Vermont utility. The malware code was found in a laptop that was not connected to the organization's grid systems, highlighting vulnerabilities in the software that allowed for the intrusion. This incident underscores the risks posed by software vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure systems like the electrical grid [58070]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is malicious. The incident involved Russian hackers attempting to penetrate the U.S. electrical grid by planting malware code associated with the Russian hacking operation Grizzly Steppe in a Vermont utility's system [58070]. The discovery of the code raised fears that Russian government hackers were actively trying to penetrate the grid to carry out potential attacks, indicating malicious intent to disrupt operations and potentially manipulate the grid [58070]. The incident was seen as a direct threat to the state of Vermont, with officials expressing concerns about the possibility of shutting down the grid in the middle of winter [58070].
Additionally, the joint analysis report by the FBI and DHS highlighted that the Russian military and civilian services' activity, including the cyber-enabled operations directed at the U.S. government and its citizens, was part of an ongoing campaign of cyber-enabled operations, indicating a deliberate and malicious effort to target U.S. networks [58070]. The report also mentioned that the hackers involved in the Russian operation used fraudulent emails to trick recipients into revealing passwords, further demonstrating malicious intent [58070]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
accidental_decisions |
The intent of the software failure incident described in the articles appears to be related to potential malicious activities by Russian hackers. The incident involved the detection of a malware code associated with the Russian hacking operation within the system of a Vermont utility. While the Russians did not actively use the code to disrupt operations, the discovery raised fears that Russian government hackers are actively trying to penetrate the grid to carry out potential attacks [58070].
This incident suggests an intent of potential disruption or manipulation of the utility's operations by the hackers. The attack was described as beyond hackers having electronic joy rides and was seen as a direct threat to the state of Vermont [58070]. The article also mentions that it is unclear what the intentions of the Russians might have been, with possibilities including disrupting the utility's operations or testing the ability to penetrate a portion of the grid [58070].
Therefore, based on the information provided in the articles, the intent of the software failure incident appears to be more aligned with the option of 'accidental_decisions' due to mistakes or unintended decisions made by the hackers in attempting to access and potentially manipulate the grid. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 58070 was not due to development incompetence. It was reported that a code associated with the Russian hacking operation was detected within the system of a Vermont utility, indicating a deliberate attempt by external actors to infiltrate the system [58070].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 58070 was accidental. The malware code associated with the Russian hacking operation was detected in a laptop that was not connected to the organization’s grid systems. The company took immediate action to isolate the laptop and alert federal authorities, indicating that the infiltration was accidental and not actively used to disrupt operations [58070]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident reported in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident involved the detection of a malware code associated with the Russian hacking operation within the system of a Vermont utility. The malware was found in a laptop that was not connected to the organization's grid systems, and immediate action was taken to isolate the laptop and alert federal authorities [58070]. This indicates that the failure was temporary and did not result in a permanent disruption to the utility's operations. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article did not involve a crash where the system lost state and did not perform any of its intended functions. The incident was related to the detection of a malware code within the system of a Vermont utility, which was not actively used to disrupt operations [Article 58070].
(b) omission: The software failure incident did not involve an omission where the system omitted to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The incident was more about the detection of the malware code within the system rather than the system omitting any functions [Article 58070].
(c) timing: The software failure incident did not involve a timing issue where the system performed its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The incident was more focused on the detection of the malware code within the system and the potential implications of such a breach [Article 58070].
(d) value: The software failure incident did not involve a value issue where the system performed its intended functions incorrectly. The incident was related to the detection of a malware code within the system, which was not actively used to disrupt operations [Article 58070].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaved erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident was more about the detection of the malware code within the system and the concerns raised about potential Russian hacking attempts on the U.S. electrical grid [Article 58070].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized as a security breach due to the detection of a malware code associated with Russian hacking within the system of a Vermont utility. The incident raised concerns about the vulnerabilities of the nation's electrical grid and the potential threats posed by Russian government hackers [Article 58070]. |