| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to privacy vulnerability in Skype has happened again within the same organization. Researchers disclosed the vulnerability to Skype in 2010, and it was published in 2011. However, the vulnerability was still unfixed when someone posted a script online in 2012 showing Skype being exploited to uncover IP addresses [12062].
(b) The incident also indicates that similar issues are faced by other peer-to-peer software companies, as mentioned by Adrian Asher, director of product security for Skype, who stated that this is an ongoing, industry-wide issue faced by all peer-to-peer software companies [12062]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the case of Skype's privacy vulnerability. Researchers disclosed a vulnerability to Skype in 2010, and despite being informed about it, Skype had not fixed the issue even a year later. This failure to address the vulnerability introduced by system development and updates led to the exploitation of Skype to uncover users' IP addresses and locations [12062].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in how the vulnerability in Skype allowed for the exploitation of users' IP addresses through specific operations within the software. By conducting masked calls and enabling debug logging, individuals could obtain sensitive information about users' locations without their knowledge. This misuse of the system's features for tracking users' movements highlights a failure in the operation of Skype's software [12062]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in the article is primarily due to a vulnerability within the Skype software itself. Researchers discovered a privacy vulnerability in Skype that allowed them to uncover the IP addresses and city locations of users by exploiting the software's functionality, such as conducting masked calls and accessing contact information cards [12062].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involves external factors, such as the researchers notifying Skype about the vulnerability in 2010 and publishing the information in 2011. Additionally, the incident was exacerbated by someone posting a script online that demonstrated how to exploit the patched version of Skype to obtain IP addresses in a different manner. This external disclosure and exploitation of the vulnerability from outside sources contributed to the ongoing issue [12062]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions. Researchers discovered a privacy vulnerability in Skype that allowed the identification of users' IP addresses and geographic locations. This vulnerability was left unfixed by Skype even after being notified about it in 2010, leading to the exploitation of the software by scripts and tools that could uncover sensitive user information [12062].
(b) However, human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. The researchers disclosed the vulnerability to Skype in 2010, and Skype's response to the issue, as well as the delay in fixing the problem, were influenced by human decisions and actions within the company [12062]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles does not seem to be directly related to hardware issues. The vulnerability that allowed the identification of IP addresses and geographic locations of Skype users was due to a flaw in the software itself, as researchers were able to exploit the software to obtain sensitive information [12062].
(b) The software failure incident was primarily caused by contributing factors originating in the software. Researchers identified a privacy vulnerability in Skype that allowed them to uncover the IP addresses and city locations of users by exploiting the software through masked calls and other techniques. The failure was related to a flaw in the software code that allowed for this unauthorized access to user information [12062]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as malicious. Researchers discovered a privacy vulnerability in Skype that allowed for the identification of users' IP addresses and city locations. This vulnerability was exploited by individuals who posted scripts online to uncover IP addresses, track users' movements, and obtain location information surreptitiously. The incident involved intentional exploitation of the software vulnerability for potentially harmful purposes [12062].
(b) The incident does not align with a non-malicious failure as it involved intentional exploitation of the vulnerability to gather sensitive information about users without their knowledge or consent. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be seen in the case of Skype's handling of a privacy vulnerability. Researchers disclosed a vulnerability to Skype in 2010, but Skype did not fix the issue even after it was made public in 2011. The researchers were surprised to find the vulnerability still unfixed, and Skype's response seemed to downplay the urgency of the situation by referring to it as an industry-wide issue faced by all peer-to-peer software companies. This delay in addressing the vulnerability can be attributed to poor decisions made by Skype in prioritizing the fix and potentially underestimating the severity of the issue [12062].
(b) The software failure incident can also be linked to accidental decisions or unintended consequences. The researchers discovered that by making a masked call to a user, they could obtain the IP address and city location of Skype users without their knowledge. This unintended consequence of the software design allowed for surreptitious tracking of users' movements. Additionally, the technique involving enabling debug logging and viewing vcard information to obtain IP addresses was likely not an intended feature of the software but rather a loophole that could be exploited. These accidental decisions or unintended consequences contributed to the failure of maintaining user privacy and security [12062]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the case of Skype's privacy vulnerability. Researchers disclosed the vulnerability to Skype in 2010, and it was published in 2011, yet the issue remained unfixed for an extended period. The researchers were surprised to find the vulnerability still present in the software even after someone posted a script online demonstrating how Skype could be exploited to uncover users' IP addresses [12062].
(b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is highlighted by the fact that the researchers discovered the vulnerability by conducting a masked call to a user, which allowed them to obtain IP addresses surreptitiously. Additionally, the technique to exploit a patched version of Skype 5.5 to obtain an IP address in a different manner was released anonymously on Pastebin, indicating an accidental exposure of the method to exploit the software [12062]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident in the article seems to be more of a permanent nature. The vulnerability allowing the identification of IP addresses and geographic locations of Skype users was reported to Skype in 2010, but it remained unfixed even after researchers disclosed it and published the information in 2011 [12062]. The fact that the vulnerability was still exploitable even after a patched version of Skype was released indicates that the issue was deeply embedded in the code and would require heavy restructuring to resolve, suggesting a more permanent failure [12062]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the vulnerability in Skype allowed for the exposure of users' IP addresses and geographic locations without causing the system to crash [12062].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can be categorized under omission, as the system omitted to protect users' privacy by allowing the disclosure of IP addresses and geographic locations, which was not the intended function of the software [12062].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early. Instead, the vulnerability allowed for the immediate exposure of sensitive information without any delay in the system's response [12062].
(d) value: The software failure incident falls under the category of value failure, as the system performed its intended functions incorrectly by exposing users' IP addresses and geographic locations, compromising their privacy and security [12062].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure, which involves inconsistent responses and interactions within a distributed system. In this case, the vulnerability in Skype led to a consistent method of exposing users' IP addresses and locations [12062].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a privacy breach. The system failed to protect users' privacy by allowing unauthorized access to sensitive information, leading to a significant security flaw [12062]. |