Incident: Security Vulnerabilities in Skype Endanger Users in Oppressive Regimes

Published Date: 2011-03-16

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident regarding security concerns with Skype was reported in the article published on 2011-03-16 [4727]. Therefore, the software failure incident happened in March 2011.
System 1. Skype's security measures and protocols [4727]
Responsible Organization 1. Skype [4727]
Impacted Organization 1. Users living in oppressive regimes, particularly in China and Middle Eastern countries, were impacted by the security concerns in Skype's software [4727].
Software Causes 1. Lack of unique IDs in the Skype interface, allowing for impersonation in the user list [4727]. 2. Downloads of Skype not made through a secure connection, leading to the possibility of compromised versions of the software being offered [4727]. 3. Vulnerabilities in the audio compression system used in Skype, allowing for the identification of phrases with a high degree of accuracy even with encryption applied [4727].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of secure connection for Skype downloads, allowing other sites to offer compromised versions of the software [4727]. 2. Use of names rather than unique IDs in the Skype interface, leading to impersonation in the user list [4727]. 3. Filtering of text in Skype chats by a Skype partner in China, potentially affecting user experience and security [4727].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident in Skype, as reported by Privacy International, exposed users in oppressive regimes to avoidable risks due to security vulnerabilities [4727]. 2. The use of names instead of unique IDs in the Skype interface allowed for impersonation in the user list, potentially leading to privacy breaches and misuse of user identities [4727]. 3. The lack of secure connections for Skype downloads enabled other sites to masquerade as the main site and offer compromised versions of the software, leading to potential malware infections and security breaches [4727]. 4. The audio compression system used in Skype was identified as vulnerable, allowing for the identification of phrases with a high degree of accuracy even with encryption applied, compromising the privacy and security of user communications [4727].
Preventions 1. Implementing unique IDs instead of names in the Skype interface could have prevented impersonation in the user list [4727]. 2. Ensuring that Skype downloads are made through a secure connection (e.g., https) would have prevented other sites from masquerading as the main site and offering compromised versions of the software [4727]. 3. Using a more secure audio compression system that does not allow phrases to be identified with high accuracy, even with encryption applied, could have enhanced security and privacy for users [4727].
Fixes 1. Implementing unique IDs instead of names in the Skype interface to prevent impersonation and enhance security [4727]. 2. Ensuring that Skype downloads are made through a secure connection (e.g., https) to prevent compromised versions of the software from being offered by malicious sites [4727]. 3. Enhancing the audio compression system used in Skype to improve the accuracy of phrase identification and overall security, possibly by exploring more robust encryption methods [4727].
References 1. Privacy International - The advocacy group that identified security concerns with Skype [4727] 2. Eric King - Privacy International's human rights and technology adviser who commented on Skype's security issues [4727] 3. Skype - The company that responded to Privacy International's concerns about security vulnerabilities [4727] 4. University of North Carolina - Conducted research on the vulnerability of Skype's audio compression system [4727]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to security concerns with Skype has happened before within the same organization. Privacy International highlighted various weaknesses in Skype's security, such as the use of names instead of unique IDs, insecure downloads, and vulnerabilities in the audio compression system [4727]. (b) The incident has also raised concerns about similar security issues in other organizations or services. Privacy International compared Skype's lack of SSL for downloading with other platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Google Mail that offer default SSL connections, questioning why Skype is not prepared to do the same [4727].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where Privacy International identified weaknesses in Skype's design that could put users at risk. For example, the use of names rather than unique IDs in the Skype interface allowed for impersonation in the user list, and the lack of secure connections for Skype downloads led to compromised versions of the software being offered in the past in China [4727]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article where it was mentioned that a Skype partner in China was filtering text in Skype chats, potentially affecting the security and encryption systems. Additionally, the lack of SSL for downloading Skype made it susceptible to a "man in the middle" attack, exposing users to interception and surveillance [4727].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to Skype's security concerns, as highlighted by Privacy International, includes issues such as the use of names instead of unique IDs in the Skype interface, insecure downloads, and vulnerabilities in the audio compression system [4727]. These issues are internal to the Skype system and are contributing factors originating from within the software itself. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involves factors originating from outside the system, such as the possibility of compromised versions of the software being offered by other sites masquerading as the main Skype site, as seen in past incidents in China [4727]. Additionally, the lack of SSL for downloading Skype exposes users to potential "man in the middle" attacks, indicating external factors impacting the software failure incident.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident related to non-human actions in the articles is primarily due to weaknesses in the Skype software itself, such as the use of names instead of unique IDs in the interface, insecure downloading of the software, and vulnerabilities in the audio compression system [4727]. (b) The software failure incident related to human actions in the articles is highlighted by Privacy International's criticisms of Skype's security practices and the potential risks posed to users due to the company's misleading security assurances. Additionally, the article mentions the possibility of a "man in the middle" attack due to the lack of SSL for downloading Skype, which could be exploited by malicious actors [4727].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The articles do not mention any software failure incident occurring due to contributing factors originating in hardware. (b) The software failure incident mentioned in the articles is related to security concerns in Skype's software. Privacy International identified weaknesses in Skype's software, such as the use of names instead of unique IDs, insecure downloads, and vulnerabilities in the audio compression system. These software-related issues could potentially lead to security risks for users, especially those in oppressive regimes [4727].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious, non-malicious (a) The software failure incident related to malicious intent can be seen in the article where it is mentioned that a Skype partner in China was filtering text in Skype chats, leading to some words not being displayed. This action was seen as a form of censorship and interference with the app, indicating malicious intent to control communication [4727]. (b) The software failure incident related to non-malicious factors can be observed in the article where Privacy International highlighted various weaknesses in Skype's security and privacy measures, such as the use of names instead of unique IDs, insecure downloads, and vulnerabilities in the audio compression system. These issues were pointed out as unintentional flaws in the system that exposed users to risks [4727].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be seen in the case of Skype's security concerns highlighted by Privacy International. Privacy International criticized Skype for using names instead of unique IDs in the interface, allowing impersonation in the user list. Additionally, the lack of secure connections for Skype downloads enabled other sites to offer compromised versions of the software, particularly in China. These decisions contributed to security risks for users, especially those in oppressive regimes [4727].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The article highlights several security concerns raised by Privacy International regarding Skype's software. These concerns include the use of names instead of unique IDs in the Skype interface, insecure downloads of the software, and vulnerabilities in the audio compression system. Privacy International's human rights and technology adviser, Eric King, criticizes Skype for misleading security assurances and exposing users to risks due to these vulnerabilities [4727]. (b) The article mentions incidents where Skype downloads were compromised in the past in China, allowing other sites to masquerade as the main site and offer compromised versions of the software. Additionally, it is noted that a Skype partner in China was filtering text in Skype chats, potentially affecting security and encryption systems. Privacy International also alleges that the Chinese government produced a "Trojan-infected" version of Skype, leaving users exposed to interception, impersonation, and surveillance [4727].
Duration permanent The software failure incident related to Skype's security concerns, as reported by Privacy International, can be considered as a permanent failure. This is because the identified weaknesses in Skype's security, such as the use of names instead of unique IDs, insecure downloads, and vulnerabilities in the audio compression system, were inherent to the design and implementation of the software [4727]. These issues were not temporary or isolated incidents but rather ongoing vulnerabilities that could potentially expose users to risks continuously.
Behaviour omission, value, other (a) crash: The articles do not mention any specific incidents of the Skype software crashing and losing state. (b) omission: The articles highlight concerns about the security weaknesses in Skype, such as the use of names instead of unique IDs, which could lead to impersonation in the user list. Additionally, the lack of SSL for downloading Skype could lead to a "man in the middle" attack, where the system omits to provide a secure connection for users [4727]. (c) timing: There is no specific mention of timing-related failures in the articles. (d) value: The articles discuss concerns about the audio compression system used in Skype, which allows phrases to be identified with a high degree of accuracy, even with encryption applied. This could be considered a failure in terms of the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [4727]. (e) byzantine: The articles do not describe any instances of the Skype software behaving with inconsistent responses or interactions. (f) other: The other behavior described in the articles is related to the security vulnerabilities in Skype, such as the possibility of compromised versions of the software being offered by other sites, the potential for interception, impersonation, and surveillance due to lack of SSL, and the use of a vulnerable audio compression codec despite encryption [4727].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) death: There is no mention of people losing their lives due to the software failure incident in the provided article [4727]. (b) harm: The article does not mention any physical harm caused to people due to the software failure incident [4727]. (c) basic: There is no information in the article about people's access to food or shelter being impacted by the software failure incident [4727]. (d) property: The software failure incident did impact people's material goods, money, or data. Privacy International raised concerns about the security vulnerabilities in Skype, such as the potential for compromised versions of the software being offered in China, which could lead to interception, impersonation, and surveillance [4727]. (e) delay: The article does not mention any activities being postponed due to the software failure incident [4727]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted by the software failure incident. Privacy International highlighted the vulnerabilities in Skype's security system, which could expose users to interception, impersonation, and surveillance [4727]. (g) no_consequence: The article does not state that there were no real observed consequences of the software failure incident [4727]. (h) theoretical_consequence: Privacy International discussed potential consequences of the software failure incident, such as users being exposed to interception, impersonation, and surveillance due to the security vulnerabilities in Skype [4727]. (i) other: The article does not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure incident [4727].
Domain unknown The software failure incident related to the Skype security concerns reported by Privacy International does not directly specify the industry that the failed system was intended to support. The focus of the articles is on the security vulnerabilities and risks associated with Skype's messaging and internet phone service, rather than the specific industry it was intended to support. Therefore, the industry that the failed system was intended to support remains unknown based on the provided articles.

Sources

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