Incident: Web Traffic Hijacking Incident Impacting Global Internet Users.

Published Date: 2010-10-08

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident happened in March and April [3357].
System 1. Domain Name System (DNS) root servers 2. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
Responsible Organization 1. The software failure incident was caused by the redirection of Internet traffic to Chinese servers, which was likely orchestrated by entities within China [3357].
Impacted Organization 1. Popular sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and about 20 or 30 others [3357] 2. Many departments of the U.S. government and almost every Fortune 500 company in the U.S. [3357]
Software Causes 1. The software failure incident was caused by a fundamental weakness in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) used to make routing decisions on the Internet, leading to the redirection of Internet traffic to Chinese servers [3357].
Non-software Causes 1. The failure incident was caused by a fundamental weakness in the Border Gateway Protocol used to make routing decisions on the Internet [3357].
Impacts 1. Web traffic involving popular U.S. sites and e-mail from computers around the globe was re-directed to Chinese servers unnecessarily, leading to a situation where traffic to popular sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and others was being redirected to servers in China, giving Web surfers in western countries a glimpse of what Chinese Internet users see when they try to access blocked sites [3357]. 2. Approximately 37,000 routes, representing about 10 percent of the total routes, were diverted through networks in China for 17 minutes, potentially allowing operators of those servers to read, delete, or edit unencrypted e-mail and other communications passing through those servers [3357]. 3. The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption used by e-commerce sites to protect traffic over the Internet was compromised, potentially exposing supposedly protected traffic to interception and modification [3357]. 4. The incident raised concerns about the security and privacy of communications passing through the diverted routes, as well as the potential implications for organizations, including many departments of the U.S. government and almost every Fortune 500 company in the U.S., whose traffic was affected [3357].
Preventions 1. Implementing stronger encryption protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) to secure communications and prevent unauthorized interception [3357]. 2. Enhancing network security measures to detect and prevent unauthorized routing changes or hijacking attempts [3357]. 3. Developing more robust authentication mechanisms to verify the legitimacy of routing announcements and prevent malicious redirections [3357]. 4. Increasing awareness and monitoring of unusual network traffic patterns to quickly identify and respond to potential incidents of traffic redirection [3357].
Fixes 1. Implementing improvements in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to address the fundamental weakness that allowed the routing hijacks to occur [3357]. 2. Developing protocols or mechanisms to prevent route hijacking on the Internet, although this solution is expected to take years to implement [3357].
References 1. Rodney Joffe, senior technologist at DNS registry Neustar [3357] 2. Bert Hubert, founder of Dutch-based software provider PowerDNS.com [3357] 3. Xiaodong Lee, chief technology officer at the China Internet Network Information Center [3357]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the redirection of Web traffic to Chinese servers has happened again at one_organization. The incident occurred at least twice, with large amounts of traffic being routed to China in March and April. The incident involved popular sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and others being redirected to servers in China, affecting organizations such as departments of the U.S. government and Fortune 500 companies [3357]. (b) The software failure incident related to the redirection of Web traffic to Chinese servers has also happened at multiple_organization. The incident was not isolated to a single organization but impacted a "large number of well-known organizations," including many departments of the U.S. government and almost every Fortune 500 company in the U.S. Traffic originating near or in the Asia Pacific region had a higher chance of being diverted through China [3357].
Phase (Design/Operation) design (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is related to the design phase. The incident involved the rerouting of Internet traffic to Chinese servers, which was a result of a fundamental weakness in the Border Gateway Protocol used to make routing decisions on the Internet [3357]. This weakness allowed for the hijacking of routes, leading to the redirection of traffic to China. The incident was not due to the operation or misuse of the system but rather a flaw in the design of the routing protocol.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is primarily due to contributing factors that originate from within the system. The incident involved the rerouting of Internet traffic to Chinese servers, which was a result of traffic interception via DNS root servers and a fundamental weakness in the Border Gateway Protocol used for routing decisions on the Internet [3357]. The redirection of traffic to China allowed for the potential interception, reading, deletion, or modification of unencrypted communications passing through those servers [3357]. The incident highlights vulnerabilities within the system that allowed for such redirections to occur, indicating an internal system failure. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident can also be attributed to contributing factors that originate from outside the system. The redirection of Internet traffic to Chinese servers was enabled by the decentralized nature of traffic flows on the Internet, where network information centers, carriers, and other infrastructure players announce available paths to specific destinations [3357]. China effectively positioned itself in the path of traffic by taking advantage of this decentralized system, allowing for the interception and redirection of traffic. Additionally, the incident was related to attacks on Google and other tech firms originating in China, suggesting external factors influencing the software failure incident [3357].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions. The incident involved the rerouting of Internet traffic to Chinese servers, which was a result of traffic interception via one of the main DNS root servers. This redirection led to Web surfers in western countries seeing error messages or censored Chinese-language versions of websites, indicating a non-human action causing the failure [3357]. (b) While the incident was primarily due to non-human actions, human actions also played a role in the sense that operators of the servers in China had the capability to read, delete, or edit unencrypted e-mail and other communications passing through those servers during the time of the redirection. This highlights the potential consequences of human actions in exploiting the software failure incident [3357].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is not directly attributed to hardware issues. The incident primarily involved the rerouting of Internet traffic to Chinese servers, which was facilitated by weaknesses in the Border Gateway Protocol and the self-guided nature of Internet traffic flows [3357]. (b) The software failure incident is related to software vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the Border Gateway Protocol, which is used to make routing decisions on the Internet. The incident involved the redirection of Internet traffic to Chinese servers, potentially allowing for interception and manipulation of unencrypted communications passing through those servers [3357].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. It involved the rerouting of Internet traffic to Chinese servers, allowing for potential interception, reading, deletion, or modification of unencrypted communications passing through those servers. This redirection was not accidental but rather a deliberate hijacking of traffic flows on the Internet, enabling the interception and potential manipulation of data. The incident was linked to a fundamental weakness in the Border Gateway Protocol and was seen as a serious security threat, especially considering the sensitive nature of the data being transmitted [3357].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident described in the articles seems to be more related to poor_decisions. The incident involved intentional redirection of Internet traffic to Chinese servers, allowing for potential interception and manipulation of data. This redirection was enabled by exploiting a fundamental weakness in the Border Gateway Protocol, a protocol used to make routing decisions on the Internet. The incident was not considered an accident but rather a deliberate action that took advantage of the decentralized nature of Internet traffic routing [3357].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. The incident seems to be more related to a fundamental weakness in the Border Gateway Protocol and the self-guided nature of traffic flows on the Internet, rather than a failure due to lack of professional competence by humans or development organizations. (b) The software failure incident related to an accidental occurrence is suggested in the article. Bert Hubert, founder of Dutch-based software provider PowerDNS.com, mentioned that what happened in China was likely an accident. He compared it to other mistakes made by countries in the past, indicating that such glitches and misdirects in Web traffic can be accidental occurrences rather than intentional actions [3357].
Duration temporary The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. It involved the rerouting of Internet traffic to Chinese servers on at least two occasions in March and April, lasting for a limited duration each time. The first instance occurred on March 24, affecting popular sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, with the duration being unspecified [3357]. The second incident took place on April 8, where 37,000 routes were diverted through networks in China for 17 minutes [3357]. These temporary disruptions in Internet traffic routing were due to specific circumstances rather than being a permanent failure.
Behaviour omission, other (a) crash: The incident described in the articles does not directly involve a system crash where the system loses state and stops performing its intended functions [3357]. (b) omission: The software failure incident involved the system omitting to perform its intended functions by redirecting Web traffic to Chinese servers, causing popular sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to be inaccessible or displaying error messages [3357]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident was crucial as it involved the system redirecting Internet traffic to Chinese servers for specific durations on March 24 and April 8, affecting a significant portion of the routes for a limited time [3357]. (d) value: The software failure incident did not directly involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly in terms of the values or outputs produced [3357]. (e) byzantine: The incident did not exhibit the characteristics of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [3357]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a hijacking of Internet traffic, where the system allowed itself to intercept and potentially modify the traffic passing through, leading to concerns about data privacy and security [3357].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, theoretical_consequence (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure. The software failure incident described in the article resulted in the redirection of significant amounts of Internet traffic to servers in China, potentially allowing operators of those servers to read, delete, or edit unencrypted email and other communications passing through them. This had implications for data security and privacy, as even supposedly protected traffic could have been exposed due to compromises in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption used by e-commerce sites [3357].
Domain information, government (a) The incident involved the redirection of Web traffic from popular U.S. sites and e-mail from computers globally to Chinese servers, impacting the production and distribution of information [3357]. The diverted traffic included access to popular sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and others, affecting users' ability to access information online. (b) The incident did not directly involve transportation systems or the movement of people and things. (c) The incident did not directly involve the extraction of natural resources from the Earth. (d) The incident did not directly involve sales transactions or the exchange of money for products. (e) The incident did not directly involve the construction industry or the creation of the built environment. (f) The incident did not directly involve the manufacturing industry or the creation of products from materials. (g) The incident did not directly involve utilities such as power, gas, steam, water, or sewage services. (h) The incident did not directly involve the finance industry or the manipulation and movement of money for profit. (i) The incident did not directly involve the knowledge industry, education, research, or space exploration. (j) The incident did not directly involve the health industry, healthcare, health insurance, or food industries. (k) The incident did not directly involve the entertainment industry, arts, sports, hospitality, or tourism. (l) The incident indirectly impacted the government sector as it mentioned that traffic from many departments of the U.S. government was diverted through China, affecting politics, defense, justice, taxes, and public services [3357]. (m) The incident was related to the information technology industry, specifically the Domain Name System (DNS) and Internet infrastructure, which is not explicitly covered in the provided options.

Sources

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